Tuesday 6 March 2018

Eu 배출권 거래 시스템 wikipedia


EU 배출권 거래 시스템 (EU ETS)


EU 배출권 거래 시스템은 설명했다.


EU 배출권 거래 시스템 (EU ETS)은 기후 변화에 대처하기위한 EU의 정책과 온실 가스 배출을 비용 효과적으로 줄이기위한 핵심 도구의 초석입니다. 그것은 세계 최초의 주요 탄소 시장이며 여전히 가장 큰 탄소 시장입니다.


31 개국 (모두 28 개 EU 국가와 아이슬란드, 리히텐슈타인 및 노르웨이)에서 11,000 개 이상의 무거운 에너지 사용 시설 (발전소 및 산업 설비) 및 이들 국가 간 운항하는 항공사의 배출을 EU의 온실 가스의 약 45 % 배출.


자세한 개요는 다음을 참조하십시오.


'모자와 무역'시스템.


EU ETS는 '상한 및 무역'원칙에 따라 작업합니다.


한도는 시스템에 의해 보호되는 시설에서 배출 될 수있는 특정 온실 가스의 총량으로 설정됩니다. 총 배출량이 감소하도록 시간이 지남에 따라 배출량이 감소합니다.


상한선 내에서 회사는 필요에 따라 서로 교역 할 수있는 배출권을 받거나 구입합니다. 그들은 또한 전세계의 배출 저감 사업으로부터 국제 신용을 제한적으로 구입할 수 있습니다. 이용 가능한 총 허용 한도의 한도로 인해 가치가 있음을 보장합니다.


해마다 회사는 모든 배출량을 충당하기 위해 충분한 수당을 내야하며, 그렇지 않으면 무거운 벌금이 부과됩니다. 회사가 배출량을 줄이면 예비 수당을 유지하여 미래의 필요를 충당하거나 수당이 부족한 다른 회사에 판매 할 수 있습니다.


Trading은 최소 비용으로 배출량을 줄이는 유연성을 제공합니다. 견고한 탄소 가격은 또한 깨끗하고 저탄소 기술에 대한 투자를 촉진합니다.


3 단계 (2013-2020)의 주요 기능


EU ETS는 현재 3 단계에 있으며 단계 1 및 2와는 크게 다릅니다.


주요 변경 사항은 다음과 같습니다.


이전의 전국 대두 시스템 대신에 EU 배출권 한도가 적용된다. 경매는 공짜 할당 대신 공제액을 할당하는 기본 방법이며, 공짜로 할당 된 공제액에 조화 된 할당 규칙이 적용된다. 가스에는 NER 300 프로그램을 통해 혁신 신 재생 에너지 기술 및 탄소 포집 및 저장 배치에 자금을 지원하는 신입 자 예비 (New Entrants Reserve)에 3 억 개의 수당이 포함되었습니다.


섹터와 가스가 덮였습니다.


이 시스템은 높은 정확도로 측정, 보고 및 검증 될 수있는 배출물에 중점을 둔 다음 분야 및 가스를 포함합니다.


철강 공장 및 철, 알루미늄, 금속, 시멘트, 석회, 유리, 세라믹, 펄프, 종이, 판지, 산 및 벌크 유기 화학 물의 생산을 포함한 전력 및 열 발생 에너지 집약 산업 분야의 이산화탄소 (CO2) 질산, 아디 픽 및 글리 옥실 산 및 글리 옥살 퍼플 루오로 카본 (PFCs)의 생산으로 인한 상업용 아산화 질소 (N2O).


EU ETS 참여는이 부문의 기업에게는 필수적이지만,


일부 분야의 경우에만 특정 크기 이상의 공장 만 포함됩니다. 정부가 항공 부문에서 동일한 양의 배출량을 감축하는 재정 또는 기타 조치를 취하면 소규모 시설을 제외시킬 수 있습니다. EU ETS는 그 사이의 항공편에만 적용됩니다 유럽 ​​경제 지역 (EEA)에 위치한 공항.


배출 감축 제공.


EU ETS는 탄소에 가격을 매기고 탄소를 거래하면 효과가 있음을 증명했습니다. 계획의 설비에서의 배출량은 의도 한대로 감소하고 있으며, 3 단계 (2013 년) 시작 (2015 년 수치 참조)과 비교하여 약 5 % 정도 감소하고 있습니다.


2020 년에는 시스템이 차지하는 부문의 배출량이 2005 년보다 21 % 감소 할 것입니다.


탄소 시장 개발.


2005 년에 설립 된 EU ETS는 국제 탄소 거래의 4 분의 3 이상을 차지하는 세계 최초이자 최대 규모의 국제 배출권 거래 시스템입니다.


EU ETS는 또한 다른 국가 및 지역에서 배출권 거래의 발전을 고무하고 있습니다. EU는 EU ETS와 다른 호환 시스템을 연결하는 것을 목표로합니다.


주요 EU ETS 법안.


2013 년 4 월 30 일 - 유럽 의회와 이사회의 Directive 2003 / 87 / EC의 통합 버전으로 공동체 내의 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래 계획 수립 및 이사회 지침 96 / 61 / EC 23/04/2009 수정 - 지역 사회의 온실 가스 배출 허용량 거래 제도를 개선 및 확대하기 위해 2003 / 87 / EC 지침을 개정하는 유럽 의회와 이사회의 2009 / 29 / EC 지침 2009/11/19 - 2008 / 101 / EC의 Directive 2008 / 101 / EC 2004 년 10 월 27 일 - 유럽 의회의 2004 / 101 / EC Directive 2004 / 101 / EC의 Directive 2003 / 87 / EC를 개정하여 유럽 의회 내에서 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래를위한 항공 활동을 포함하는 유럽 의회와 이사회 이사회는 교토 의정서의 프로젝트 메카니즘과 관련하여 공동체 내에서 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래에 관한 계획을 수립하는 2003 / 87 / EC 지침을 개정 13/10/2003 - 유럽 의회와 EU의 지침 2003 / 87 / EC 공동체 내에서 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래를위한 계획을 수립하고 이사회 지침 96 / 61 / EC를 개정한다.


탄소 시장 보고서.


2011 년 1 월 23 일 - COM (2017) 693 - 유럽 탄소 시장의 기능에 관한보고 01/02/2017 - COM (2017) 48 - 유럽 탄소 시장의 기능에 관한 보고서 18/11/2015 - COM 2015) 576 - 유럽 탄소 시장의 기능에 관한 보고서 14/11/2012 - COM (2012) 652 - 2012 년 유럽의 탄소 시장 현황.


3 단계 EU ETS 개정.


2011 년 4 월 2 일 - 2011 년 2 월 4 일의 유럽 이사회 결론 (결론 23 및 24 참조) 18/03/2010 - EU ETS 지침 (항공 활동 제외)의 부속서 I에 대한 지침 18/03/2010 - 지침 기후 변화 및 에너지 패키지 채택에 관한 협의회 보도 자료 12/12/2008 - 유럽 이사회 의장단 결론 (2008 년 12 월 11 일과 12 월 12 일) 12/12/2008 - 유럽위원회 경매 수익 사용에 관한 성명서 23/01/2008 - 공동체의 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래 시스템을 개선하고 확장하기 위해 유럽 의회와 이사회가 지침 2003 / 87 / EC를 개정하는 지침의 제안 23 / 2008 년 1 월 - 위원회 직원 문서 - EU 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래 시스템을 개선하고 확장하기 위해 지침 2003 / 87 / EC를 개정하는 유럽 의회와 이사회 지침에 대한 제안서 첨부 문서 - 영향 평가.


이행.


04/07/2013 - 국제 신용 자격 결정에 관한 개정 된 초안 규칙 05/06/2013 - 국제 신용 증서 결정에 관한 초안 규칙 05/05/2013 2013 년 5 월 2 일의 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 389/2013에 따라 Union Registry 설립 유럽 ​​의회와 이사회의 2003 / 87 / EC 지침, Decisions No 280 / 2004 / EC 및 No 406 / 2009 / EC의 유럽 의회와 이사회 및 Commission Regulation (EU) No 920/2010을 폐지하고 No 1193/2011 EEA 관련성있는 문서 18/11/2011 - 2013 년 1 월 1 일부터 시작되는 거래 기간과 이후의 거래 기간에 대한 EU 집행위원회 설립 지침 (2003 / 87 / EC 지침 유럽 ​​의회와 유럽 의회와 이사회의 결정 및 의사 결정 280 / 2004 / EC 및 개정 규칙 (EC) No 2216/2004 및 (EU) No 920/2010 - 아직 공식 저널 07 / 10/2010 - 위원회 Regul 유럽 ​​의회와 이사회의 2003 / 87 / EC 지침 및 유럽 의회와 이사회의 Decision No 280 / 2004 / EC에 따른 레지스트리의 표준화되고 보안 된 시스템에 대한 920/2010 유럽 ​​의회 및 이사회의 2003 / 87 / EC 지침에 따라 표준화되고 안전한 등록 시스템에 대한 Commission Regulation (EC) No 994/2008 EU의 ETS와 노르웨이, 아이슬란드 및 리히텐슈타인을 연결하는 EEA 공동위원회 결정 No 146/2007 2011 년 12 월 31 일까지 적용 가능한 버전 - 유럽 의회와 이사회의 결정 No 280 / 2004 / EC - 2011 년 12 월 31 일까지 적용되는 버전 13 / 11 / 2006 - 유럽 의회와 이사회의 2003 / 87 / EC 지침에 따라 교토 의정서에 따른 사업 활동을위한 공동체 배출권 거래 제도에 따른 온실 가스 배출 감축에 대한 DOUBLE COUNTING 피하기에 관한위원회 결정 2006 / 780 / EC (n 문서 번호 C (2006) 5362에 의거 해) 2002 년 12 월 12 일 - 7 월 31 일자위원회 규정 (EC) No 916/2007에 의해 개정 된 표준화되고 보안 된 레지스트리 시스템에 대한 EC (Commission Regulation) 2216/2004의 통합 버전 2007 년 11 월 18 일 규정에 의한 변경 사항을 제외하고 2008 년 10 월 8 일의 Commission Regulation (EC) No 994/2008 및 2010 년 10 월 7 일의 Commission Regulation (EU) No 920/2010.


부가가치세 적용.


지침 2003 / 87 / EC의 입법 연혁.


위원회 제안 이전에 일하십시오.


08/2002 - COM (2000) 87 - 유럽 연합 집행위원회의 온실 가스 배출량 보고서 및 ECCP 실무 그룹 1의 결과 : 유연한 메커니즘 04/09/2001 - 의장 요약문 이해 관계자 자문 회의 기록 (Industry 1999 년 5 월 19 일 - COM (1999) 230 - 교토 의정서의 이행을위한 준비 03/06/1998 - COM (1998) 353 - EU ETS의 EU 포스트 교토 전략 범위를 향한 기후 변화 : 07/2007 - EU 배출권 거래 시스템 내의 소규모 설비 - 2006 년 10 월 - EU 배출권 거래 시스템에 추가 활동 및 가스 추가 조화 및 예측 가능성 증대 : 12/2006 - 신규 진입 및 폐쇄에 대한 접근 10/2006 - EU에서의 CO2 배출권 경매 ETS 10/2006 - 할당 방법의 조화 12/2006 - 국제 경쟁력에 대한 보고서 EU ETS의 검토를위한 배출권 거래에 관한 ECCP 실무 그룹 15/06/2007 - 4th mee의 최종 보고서 2007 년 제 3 국의 배출권 거래 시스템 연계에 관한 협조 22/05/2007 - 추가 조화 및 예측 가능성에 관한 제 3 차 회의의 최종 보고서 26/04/2007 - 강력한 준수 및 시행에 관한 제 2 차 회의 최종 보고서 09/03/2007 - 지침의 범위에 관한 제 1 차 회의의 최종 보고서.


2001 년 10 월의 집행위원회 제안.


2002 년 2 월 22 일 - EC 배출권 거래 제안 (COM (2001) 581)과 IPPC Directive 23/10/2001 - COM (2001) 581 사이의 시너지 효과에 관한 비공식 문서 - 온실 가스 배출권 거래 지침 유럽 ​​공동체 내에서


위원회와 의회에서 제안서를 읽는 것에 대한위원회의 반응 (위원회의 공동 입장 포함)


18/07/2003 - COM (2003) 463 - 유럽 의회와 이사회의 지침에 관한 이사회의 공동 입장에 대한 유럽 의회 개정안에 대한위원회의 의견 20/06/2003 - COM (2003) 364 - 유럽 의회에서 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래에 관한 계획을 수립하고 이사회 지침 96 / 61 / EC 18/03/2003을 개정하는위원회의 지위에 관한 유럽 의회와의 커뮤니케이션 - EC ) No 28/2003 - 공동체 내에서 온실 가스 배출 허용 거래에 관한 계획 수립 및 이사회 지침 96 / 61 / EC 27/11/2002 수정 - COM (2002) 680 - 수정 된 제안 유럽 ​​의회와 이사회가 지 역 내에서 온실 가스 배출 허용량 거래 계획을 수립하고 이사회 지침 96 / 61 / EC를 개정 함.


모든 질문을 엽니 다.


개정 된 EU 배출권 거래 시스템에 관한 질문 및 답변 (2008 년 12 월)


배출권 거래의 목표는 무엇입니까?


EU 배출권 거래 시스템 (EU ETS)의 목표는 EU 회원국들이 온실 가스 배출량을 비용 효과적인 방법으로 제한하거나 줄이겠다는 약속을 달성하도록 돕는 것입니다. 참가 업체가 배출 허용량을 사고 팔 수 있다는 것은 배출량 삭감이 최소 비용으로 달성 될 수 있음을 의미합니다.


EU ETS는 EU의 기후 변화 대응 전략의 초석입니다. 그것은 세계 최초의 국제 이산화탄소 배출 거래 시스템으로 2005 년부터 운영되고 있습니다. 2008 년 1 월 현재, EU 회원국 27 개국뿐만 아니라 유럽 경제 지역의 다른 3 개 회원국에도 적용됩니다 - 노르웨이, 아이슬란드 및 리히텐슈타인. 현재 EU의 CO2 배출량의 절반에 가까운 부분과 총 온실 가스 배출량의 40 %를 공동으로 담당하는 에너지 및 산업 부문의 설치량은 10,000 개가 넘습니다. 2008 년 7 월에 합의 된 EU ETS Directive에 대한 개정안은 2012 년부터 항공 부문을 시스템에 도입 할 예정이다.


배출권 거래는 어떻게 이루어 집니까?


EU ETS는 '배출권 거래'시스템으로, 허용되는 전체 배출 수준을 제한하지만 그 한도 내에서 시스템 참여자가 필요에 따라 수당을 사고 팔 수 있습니다. 이러한 수당은 시스템의 중심에있는 일반적인 거래 '통화'입니다. 하나의 수당은 소유자에게 1 톤의 이산화탄소 또는 동등한 양의 다른 온실 가스를 방출 할 권리를 부여합니다. 총 수당의 한도는 시장에 희소성을 창출합니다.


이 계획에 따른 첫 번째 및 두 번째 거래 기간에 회원국은 ETS 배출량의 총 수준과 각 국가의 배출 허용량을 결정하는 국가 할당 계획 (NAP)을 작성해야했습니다. 해마다 설치물은 배출량과 동일한 허용량을 내야합니다. 배출량을 허용 수준 이하로 유지하는 회사는 초과 수당을 판매 할 수 있습니다. 탄소 배출량을 줄이는 데 어려움을 겪고있는 사람들은보다 효율적인 기술에 투자하거나 탄소 집약적 인 에너지 자원을 덜 사용하는 것과 같이 자신의 배출량을 줄이기위한 조치를 취하거나 시장에서 필요로하는 추가 수당을 구입할 수있는 선택을합니다 , 또는이 둘의 조합을 포함 할 수있다. 그러한 선택은 상대적 비용에 의해 결정될 것 같다. 이런 식으로 배출 가스가 가장 비용 효율적으로 감소됩니다.


EU ETS는 얼마 동안 운영되고 있습니까?


EU ETS는 2005 년 1 월 1 일에 시작되었습니다. 첫 거래 기간은 2007 년 말까지 3 년 동안 진행되었으며 중요한 두 번째 거래 기간을 준비하기 위해 '수행함으로써 학습'단계였습니다. 두 번째 교역 기간은 2008 년 1 월 1 일에 시작되어 2012 년 말까지 5 년간 운영됩니다. 두 번째 교역 기간의 중요성은 교토 의정서의 첫 번째 공약 기간과 일치한다는 사실에서 비롯됩니다. EU와 기타 선진국들은 온실 가스 배출을 제한하거나 줄이기 위해 목표를 달성해야한다. 두 번째 무역 기간 동안 EU ETS 배출량은 EU 전체와 회원국이 개별적으로 교토 의정서를 이행 할 수 있도록 2005 년 수준보다 약 6.5 % 가량 낮았다.


지금까지 경험으로 얻은 교훈은 무엇입니까?


EU ETS는 탄소 가격을 책정하여 온실 가스 배출량 거래가 효과가 있음을 입증했습니다. 첫 번째 무역 기간은 EU 전역의 배출 허용량에 대한 자유 무역을 성공적으로 수립하고 필요한 인프라를 구축하고 역동적 인 탄소 시장을 개발했습니다. 일부 회원국과 일부 부문에서 EU ETS 하에서 검증 된 배출량 자료가 이용 가능해질 때까지 배출 전망에 의존하기 때문에 과도한 수당 할당으로 인해 1 단계의 환경 편익이 제한 될 수있다. 2005 년에 검증 된 배출량 자료가 발표됨에 따라이 "초과 분배"가 강조되었을 때, 시장은 용인의 시장 가격을 낮춤으로써 예상대로 반응했다. 확인 된 배출 자료의 이용 가능성은위원회가 제 2 단계에서의 국가 배정에 대한 상한이 실제 배출 감축을 가져 오는 수준으로 설정되도록 보장했다.


검증 된 데이터에 대한 필요성을 강조하는 것 외에도 EU의 ETS 내에서의보다 큰 조화는 EU가 적어도 비용 및 최소한의 경쟁 왜곡으로 배출 감축 목표를 달성하는 데 필수적임을 보여주었습니다. 더 많은 조화를위한 필요성은 전반적인 배출 허용 한도가 어떻게 설정되는지에 관해서는 가장 명확하다.


처음 두 거래 기간은 설비에 대한 할당량을 할당하는 국가 별 방법이 국내 시장에서의 공정한 경쟁을 위협한다는 점을 보여줍니다. 또한 시스템의 범위, EU 외부의 배출 감축 사업에서 얻은 크레딧에 대한 접근, 다른 곳의 배출권 거래 시스템과 EU ETS를 연결하기위한 조건 및 모니터링, 검증 및 검증과 관련하여 더 큰 조화, 명확화 및 개선이 필요하다. 보고 요구 사항.


EU ETS의 주요 변경 사항은 무엇이며 언제 적용됩니까?


합의 된 설계 변경 사항은 2013 년 1 월 3 번째 거래 기간에 적용됩니다. 준비 작업이 즉시 시작되지만 규정 준수가 유지되도록 2013 년 1 월까지 해당 규칙이 변경되지 않습니다.


제 3 기 EU ETS는보다 효율적이고 조화로운 시스템이 될 것입니다.


효율성 증대는 거래 기간이 길어지면 (5 년 대신 8 년), 연간 배출량 상한선 감소 (2005 년 대비 2020 년 21 % 감소) 및 경매 금액이 크게 증가 2 단계에서 4 %, 3 단계에서 절반 이상.


cap-setting (1 단계와 2 단계에서 전국 대문자가 아닌 EU 와이드 캡)과 과도기적 자유 할당에 관한 규정을 포함하여 많은 분야에서보다 많은 조화가 합의되었다.


시스템의 공정성은 산업 설비에 대한 EU 전역의 자유 할당 규칙으로의 이동과 신입 회원국이 더 많은 수당을 경매 할 수있는 재분배 메커니즘의 도입으로 실질적으로 증가했다.


마지막 텍스트는 초기위원회 제안과 어떻게 비교됩니까?


2007 년 봄 유럽 협의회 (European Spring Council)에 의해 합의 된 기후 및 에너지 목표는 유지되었으며 EU ETS에 대한위원회의 제안의 전반적인 아키텍처는 그대로 유지됩니다. 즉, 배출권 수에 대해 EU 차원에서 하나의 상한선이있을 것이며, 이 상한선은 선형 추세선을 따라 매년 감소 할 것이며 이는 2013 년 -2020 년 3 차 거래가 끝날 때까지 계속 될 것입니다. 제안과 비교 된 주요 차이점은 수당 경매가 더 천천히 단계적으로 이루어질 것이라는 점입니다.


위원회의 제안과 비교 된 주요 변경 사항은 무엇입니까?


요약하면 제안에 대한 주요 변경 사항은 다음과 같습니다.


특정 회원국은 2013 년부터 전기 발전기에 무료로 할당 할 수있는 용돈이 없다는 규칙을 선택적으로 일시적으로 철회 할 수있다. 이 회유 옵션은 전기의 상호 연결성과 관련된 특정 조건을 충족하는 회원국에게 제공된다 그리드, 전기 생산에서의 단일 화석 연료 점유율, EU-27 평균과 관련한 GDP / capita를 포함한다. 또한, 회원국이 발전소에 할당 할 수있는 무상 수당의 양은 1 단계에서 관련 플랜트의 이산화탄소 배출량의 70 %로 제한되고 그 이후에는 감소합니다. 또한 3 단계의 무료 할당은 2008 년 말까지 운영 또는 건설중인 발전소에만 제공 될 수 있습니다. 아래 질문 15에 대한 회신을 참조하십시오. 탄소 누출의 중대한 위험에 노출 될 것으로 여겨지는 부문 또는 하위 부문을 결정하는 데 사용되는 기준에 관한 지침에 더 많은 세부 사항이 있으며위원회의 해당 부문 목록의 발행일이 더 빨라진다 (12 월 31 일) 2009). 또한 만족스러운 국제 협약에 도달했을 때 검토를 거쳐 노출 된 모든 산업의 설비는 가장 효율적인 기술을 사용하는 범위까지 100 % 무료 수당을 받게됩니다. 산업에 대한 무상 할당은 2005 년에서 2007 년까지 총 배출량에서 이들 산업의 배출량의 비율로 제한됩니다. 산업 부문의 설치에 무료로 할당되는 총 허용량은 배출량 상한선 감소와 함께 매년 감소 할 것입니다. 회원국은 또한 CO 2 비용이 탄소 누출의 위험에 노출 될 수있는 경우 전기 가격으로 전달되는 이산화탄소 비용에 대한 특정 시설을 보상 할 수 있습니다. 위원회는 이와 관련하여 환경 보호를위한 주정부 지원에 관한 공동체 지침을 수정하려고 노력했다. 아래 질문 15에 대한 회신을보십시오. 비공개 산업에 대한 경매 허용 수준은위원회가 제안한 바와 같이 선형 적으로 증가 할 것이지만, 2020 년까지 100 %에 도달하는 대신 70 %에이를 것이며 2027 년까지 100 %에 도달 할 전망이다. 위원회의 제안에 따르면 경매 허용 여력의 10 %는 1 인당 소득이있는 회원국에서 1 인당 소득이 낮은 회원국으로 재분배되어 후자가 기후 친화적 인 기술에 투자하도록 재정적 능력을 강화할 것이다. 2005 년에 교토 의정서가 정한 기준 연도에 비해 온실 가스 배출량을 최소 20 % 감축 한 회원국을 고려한 경매 허용 비율의 2 % 재분배 메커니즘에 대한 조항이 추가되었습니다. 회원국들이 주로 EU 내 기후 변화에 맞서 싸우고 적응하기 위해 권장하는 경매 수입의 비율은 개발 도상국에서 20 %에서 50 %로 상향 조정됩니다. 이 텍스트는 해당 기간 동안 할당 및 액세스와 관련하여 해당 크레딧을 가져오고 사용하는 가장 낮은 예산을받은 기존 운영자에 대해 20 % 시나리오에서 제안 된 JI / CDM 크레디트 사용의 허용 된 수준까지의 상향 조정을 제공합니다 2008-2012. 새로운 분야, 기간 2013-2020 년 및 2008-2012 년에있는 신입자는 또한 신용을 이용할 수있을 것이다. 그러나 사용될 수있는 총 크레딧 금액은 2008 년과 2020 년 사이의 감축 량의 50 %를 초과하지 않을 것입니다. 만족스러운 국제 협정의 맥락에서보다 엄격한 배출 감축 량을 감안할 때위원회는 CER 및 ERU에 대한 추가 액세스를 허용 할 수 있습니다 커뮤니티 스킴의 운영자에게 적합합니다. 아래 20 번 질문에 대한 회신을보십시오. 신규 진입자 보호 지역에서 3 억회의 경비를 경매하는 수익금은 최대 12 개의 탄소 포집 및 저장 시범 프로젝트와 혁신적인 신 재생 에너지 기술을 시연하는 프로젝트를 지원하는 데 사용될 것입니다. 이 자금 조달 메커니즘에는 여러 가지 조건이 붙어 있습니다. 아래 질문 30에 대한 회신을보십시오. 소규모 연소 설비가 동일한 조치를 취한 경우 탈퇴 가능성은 활동과 관계없이 모든 소규모 설비를 포함하도록 확대되었으며, 배출 임계 값은 1 년에 10,000 ~ 25,000 톤의 CO 2로 증가했으며, 연소 설비가 추가적으로 25MW에서 35MW로 증가되어야한다. 이러한 임계치가 증가함에 따라 잠재적으로 배출권 거래 시스템에서 제외 될 수있는 배출량의 비율이 상당 해지며 결과적으로 EU 전체의 배출량 상한선을 감축하는 조항이 추가되었다.


여전히 국가 배정 계획 (NAPs)이 있습니까?


아니오. NAPs에서 첫 번째 (2005-2007) 및 두 번째 (2008-2012) 거래 기간 동안 회원국은 발행 할 수당 총액 (총액)과 해당 시설에 대한 할당 방법을 결정했습니다. 이 접근법은 각 회원국이 자체 산업을 선호하는 인센티브를 창출하고 할당 규칙에 중대한 차이를 가져 왔으며 매우 복잡하게되었습니다.


세 번째 거래 기간부터는 단일 EU 전체 한도가 생기고 수당은 조화 된 규칙에 따라 배정 될 것입니다. 그러므로 국가 할당 계획은 더 이상 필요하지 않을 것이다.


어떻게 3 단계의 배출권 규제가 결정될 것인가?


EU 전체 상한선을 계산하는 규칙은 다음과 같습니다.


2013 년부터 연간 총 수당은 선형 적으로 감소 할 것입니다. 이 라인의 출발점은 회원국이 2013 년부터 시스템의 범위를 확대하여 조정 한 2008-12 기간 동안 회원국이 발행하는 총 허용량 (2 단계 상한선)의 평균 총량과 회원 국가는 제외하도록 선택했습니다. 연간 금액이 감소 할 선형 요인은 2 단계 상한과 관련하여 1.74 %입니다.


1.74 %의 선형 인자를 결정하기위한 출발점은 1990 년에 비해 20 %의 온실 가스 감축이며 이는 2005 년에 비해 14 % 감소한 것과 같습니다. EU ETS는 EU ETS에 비해 더 큰 감축이 필요합니다. ETS 분야에서 배출량을 줄이기 위해 더 싸게. 전반적인 감축 비용을 최소화하는 부문은 다음과 같습니다 :


2020 년까지 EU ETS 부문 배출량이 2005 년 대비 21 % 감소합니다. EU ETS의 적용을받지 않는 분야의 경우 2005 년에 비해 약 10 %의 감소를 보였다.


2020 년의 21 % 감축은 2020 년 최대 1720 백만 배당의 ETS 상한선을 가져오고, 1846 년의 평균 공제 금액 (2013 년에서 2020 년까지)과 2 단계 상한선 대비 11 % 감축을 의미합니다.


모든 절대 수치는 두 번째 거래 기간 시작 시점의 보상 범위에 해당하므로 2012 년에 추가 될 항공 및 3 단계에서 추가 될 기타 부문을 고려하지 않습니다.


3 단계의 연간 배출량 상한에 대한 최종 수치는 2010 년 9 월 30 일까지위원회가 결정하고 발표 할 예정이다.


3 단계 이상의 배출량 산정 방법은 어떻게 결정됩니까?


3 단계 상한선을 결정하는 데 사용 된 1.74 %의 선형 요인은 2020 년에 거래 기간이 끝나기까지 계속 적용될 것이며 4 번째 거래 기간 (2021 년에서 2028 년)까지의 기간을 결정하게됩니다. 늦어도 2025 년까지 개정 될 수 있습니다. 사실 세계 평균 기온 상승을 산업화 이전 수준보다 2 ℃ 이상으로 제한하는 전략적 목표를 달성하기 위해서는 1990 년 대비 60 % -80 %의 상당한 배출량 감소가 2050 년까지 필요합니다.


배출권에 대한 EU 차원의 상한선은 각 개별 연도별로 결정될 것입니다. 해당 설비의 유연성이 감소 할 것인가?


아니요. 설치 유연성은 전혀 줄어들지 않습니다. 매년 2 월 28 일까지 관할 당국은 경매와 배분을 허용해야한다. 수당을내는 마지막 날은 배출이 발생한 연도의 다음 해 4 월 30 일입니다. 따라서 운영자는 전년도의 배출량을 충당하기 위해 수당을 내야하기 전에 당해 연도의 수당을받습니다. 수당은 거래 기간 동안 유효하게 유지되며 이후 잉여 수당은 이후 거래 기간에 사용하기 위해 "뱅킹"될 수 있습니다. 이 점에서 아무것도 변하지 않을 것입니다.


이 시스템은 거래 기간을 기반으로 유지되지만, 3 차 거래 기간은 2008 년에서 2012 년까지의 두 번째 단계에서 5 년이 아니라 2013 년에서 2020 년까지 8 년 동안 지속됩니다.


두 번째 거래 기간 동안 회원국은 일반적으로 매년 동일한 총 수당을 할당하기로 결정했다. 2013 년부터 매년 감소하는 선형 적 감소는 해당 기간에 예상되는 배출량 경향에 더 잘 부합 할 것입니다.


2013 년에서 2020 년 사이의 잠정 ETS 총액은 얼마입니까?


잠정 연간 cap 수치는 다음과 같습니다.


이 수치는 2 단계 (2008 년 ~ 2012 년)에서 적용 가능한 ETS의 범위와 2 단계에 대한 국가 배분 계획에 대한위원회의 결정에 따라 2 억 8,300 만 톤에 달한다. 이 수치는 여러 가지 이유로 조정됩니다. 첫째, 회원국들이 이러한 확대에서 발생하는 배출량을 입증하고 검증한다면, 2 단계에서 범위 확장을 고려하여 조정할 것이다. 둘째, 세 번째 거래 기간에 ETS의 범위를 더 확장하는 것과 관련하여 조정이 이루어질 것이다. 셋째, 소규모 설비의 선택 해제는 상응하는 모자의 축소로 이어질 것입니다. 넷째, 수치는 항공의 포함이나 노르웨이, 아이슬란드 및 리히텐슈타인의 배출량을 고려하지 않았습니다.


수당은 여전히 ​​무료로 할당됩니까?


예. 산업 설비는 과도기적으로 무료 할당을 받게됩니다. 그리고 선택적 탈선을 할 수있는 회원국에서는 발전소가 회원국이 결정한 경우 무료 수당을받을 수있다. 2013 년 현재 사용 가능한 보조금의 최소한 절반이 경매 될 것으로 추산됩니다.


위원회는 1 차 및 2 차 무역 기간 동안 대다수의 수당이 설비에 무료로 할당되었지만, 위원회는 수당의 경매가 배분의 기본 원칙이되어야한다고 제안했다. 경매가 가장 효율적이어서 시스템의 효율성, 투명성 및 단순성을 보장하고 저탄소 경제에 대한 투자에 가장 큰 인센티브를 제공하기 때문입니다. "오염 자 부담 원칙"을 가장 잘 준수하며 무료로 수령 함에도 불구하고 명목상의 비용 공제 비용을 고객에게 전가 한 특정 부문에 이익을주는 것을 피합니다.


수당은 어떻게 무료로 나누어 줄 수 있습니까?


2010 년 12 월 31 일까지, 위원회는위원회 절차 ( "Comitology") 하에서 개발 될 EU 차원의 규칙을 채택 할 것입니다. 이 규칙은 할당을 완전히 조화 시키므로 동일하거나 유사한 활동을하는 EU의 모든 회사는 동일한 규칙을 따릅니다. 이 규칙은 배정이 탄소 효율 기술을 촉진 할 수 있도록 가능한 한 많이 보장 할 것입니다. 채택 된 규칙은 실행 가능한 한도 내에서 소위 벤치 마크에 기반한 할당을 제공한다. 과거 산출물의 수량 당 많은 수당. 이러한 규칙은 온실 가스를 줄이기위한 조기 조치를 취한 운영자에게 보상하며, 오염원 부담 원칙을보다 잘 반영하고 배출량을 줄이기위한 더 강력한 인센티브를 제공한다. 할당은 더 이상 과거 배출량에 의존하지 않기 때문이다. 모든 배정은 3 차 거래 시작 전에 결정되어야하며 사후 조정은 허용되지 않습니다.


어떤 설치가 무료 할당을 받고 어떤 설치는 그렇지 않을 것입니까? 경쟁력에 대한 부정적인 영향은 어떻게 피할 것인가?


증가 된 배출 비용을 감당할 수있는 능력을 감안할 때, 2013 년 이후 전기 경보기에 대한 전체 경매가 원칙입니다. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2013 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.


In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2013, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2013, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.


CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.


Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2010, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.


Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?


Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.


Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2010, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.


How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?


All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.


Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2013?


The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.


As from 2013, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.


As of 2012, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.


Will small installations be excluded from the scope?


A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2013, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.


How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?


For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2012, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2012 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2013-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.


These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).


On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2012 will be accepted in the period 2013-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2013 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.


To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2013 onwards in Least Developed Countries.


Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2013 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.


Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?


No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:


LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.


The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.


Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?


예. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.


Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?


A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.


A new provision will apply as of 2013 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.


The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.


Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?


예. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.


The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.


While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.


What is a Community registry and how does it work?


Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2013 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.


Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?


The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2011 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.


What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?


Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2013 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.


A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.


In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.


What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?


The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.


A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2015 for this purpose.


What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?


When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.


For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.


What are the next steps?


Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2013, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2012.


The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2010), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2010) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2011).


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Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a maximum cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by all participating installations. Installations must monitor and report their CO 2 emissions, ensuring they hand in enough allowances to the authorities to cover their emissions.


If emission exceeds what is permitted by its allowances, an installation must purchase allowances from others. Conversely, if an installation has performed well at reducing its emissions, it can sell its leftover credits. This allows the system to find the most cost-effective ways of reducing emissions without significant government intervention. The scheme has been divided into a number of "trading periods". The second trading period ran from January until December , coinciding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.


The third trading period began in January and will span until December This target has been reached six years early as emissions in the ETS fell to mln tonnes in The EU ETS has seen a number of significant changes, with the first trading period described as a 'learning by doing' phase.


Overall, since its conception, the EU ETS has been characterized by relatively high levels of policy uncertainty. As a result, the scheme has resulted in a rather informal and tepid response by regulated organizations. The "Linking Directive" allows operators to use a certain amount of Kyoto certificates from flexible mechanism projects in order to cover their emissions. These Certified Emission Reductions CERs can be obtained by implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries, outside the EU, that have ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol.


The implementation of Clean Development Projects is largely specified by the Marrakech Accords , a follow-on set of agreements by the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The legislators of the EU ETS drew up the scheme independently but called on the experiences gained during the running of the voluntary UK Emissions Trading Scheme in the previous years, [16] and collaborated with other parties to ensure its units and mechanisms were compatible with the design agreed through the UNFCCC.


Those countries then allocate allowances to their industrial operators, and track and validate the actual emissions in accordance with the relevant assigned amount. They require the allowances to be retired after the end of each year. Like any other financial instrument , trading consists of matching buyers and sellers between members of the exchange and then settling by depositing a valid allowance in exchange for the agreed financial consideration.


Much like a stock market , companies and private individuals can trade through brokers who are listed on the exchange, and need not be regulated operators. When each change of ownership of an allowance is proposed, the national registry and the European Commission are informed in order for them to validate the transaction. However, the EU was not able to link trades from all its countries until because of its technical problems connecting to the UN systems.


The total number of permits issued either auctioned or allocated determines the supply for the allowances. The actual price is determined by the market. Too many allowances compared to demand will result in a low carbon price, and reduced emission abatement efforts. The first and foremost criterion is that the proposed total quantity is in line with a Member State's Kyoto target. Of course, the Member State's plan can, and should, also take account of emission levels in other sectors not covered by the EU ETS, and address these within its own domestic policies.


This approach has been criticized [21] as giving rise to windfall profits , being less efficient than auctioning, and providing too little incentive for innovative new competition to provide clean, renewable energy. To address these problems, [ citation needed ] the European Commission proposed various changes in a January package, including the abolishment of NAPs from and auctioning a far greater share ca.


From the start of Phase III January there will be a centralised allocation of permits, not National Allocation Plans, with a greater share of auctioning of permits. Allocation can act as a means of addressing concerns over loss of competitiveness , and possible "leakage" carbon leakage of emissions outside the EU. Leakage is the effect of emissions increasing in countries or sectors that have weaker regulation of emissions than the regulation in another country or sector.


Correcting for leakage by allocating permits acts as a temporary subsidy for affected industries, but does not fix the underlying problem. Border adjustments would be the economically efficient choice, where imports are taxed according to their carbon content.


Within a certain trading period, banking and borrowing is allowed. For example, a EUA can be used in banking or in borrowing. Interperiod borrowing is not allowed.


However, the prior existence of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme meant that market participants were already in place and ready. In , carbon prices for the trial phase dropped to near zero for most of the year. Meanwhile, prices for Phase II remained significantly higher throughout, reflecting the fact that allowances for the trial phase were set to expire by 31 December Verified emissions show a net increase over the first phase of the scheme.


For the countries for which data was available, emissions increased by 1. Consequently, observers have accused national governments of abusing the system under industry pressure, and have urged for far stricter caps in the second phase The second phase 12 expanded the scope of the scheme significantly. Although this was a theoretical possibility in phase I, the over-allocation of permits combined with the inability to bank them for use in the second phase meant it was not taken up.


The full activation process will include the migration of over 30, EU ETS accounts from national registries. Aviation emissions were to be included from The airline industry and other countries including China, India, Russia, and the United States reacted adversely to the inclusion of the aviation sector.


The EU insisted that the regulation should be applied equally to all carriers, and that it did not contravene international regulations.


In the absence of a global agreement on airline emissions, the EU argued that it was forced to go ahead with its own scheme. But only flights within the EEA are covered; international flights are not. Ultimately, the Commission intended that the third trading period should cover all greenhouse gases and all sectors, including aviation, maritime transport, and forestry.


The annual Member State CO 2 yearly allowances in million tonnes are shown in the table:. Additional installations and emissions included in the second trading period are not included in this table but are given in the sources. Prices for EU allowances for December delivery dropped 8. The market had been oversupplied with permits. In July , Thomson Reuters Point Carbon stated that it considered that without intervention to reduce the supply of allowances, the price of allowances would fall to four Euros.


As well as more sectors and gases included in Phase III. Also, millions of allowances set aside in the New Entrants Reserve NER to fund the deployment of innovative renewable energy technologies and carbon capture and storage through the NER programme, one of the world's largest funding programmes for innovative low-carbon energy demonstration projects. Phase IV will commence on 1 January and finish on 31 December The European Commission plans a full review of the Directive by Connie Hedegaard, the EU Commissioner for Climate Change, hoped "to link up the ETS with compatible systems around the world to form the backbone of a global carbon market" with Australia cited as an example.


Before the European Council summit on 20 March , [72] the European Commission decided to propose a change in the functioning of the carbon market CO2 permits. The reserve would operate on predefined rules with no discretion for the Commission or Member States. The European Parliament and the European council informally agreed on an adapted version of this proposal, which sets the starting date of the MSR to so already in Phase III , puts the million backloaded allowances in the reserve and reduces the reaction time of the MSR to one year.


This adapted proposal has already passed the European parliament and is to be approved by the Council of ministers in September Emissions in the EU have been reduced at costs that are significantly lower than projected, [28] though transaction costs are related to economies of scale and can be significant for smaller installations.


It was suggested that if permits were auctioned, and the revenues used effectively, e. However, some governments and industry representatives lobby for their inclusion. The inclusion is currently opposed by NGOs as well as the EU commission itself, arguing that sinks are surrounded by too many scientific uncertainties over their permanence and that they have inferior long-term contribution to climate change compared to reducing emissions from industrial sources.


A phishing scam is suspected to have enabled hackers to log into unsuspecting companies' carbon credit accounts and transfer the allowances to themselves, allowing them to then be sold.


The European Commission said it would "proceed to determine together with national authorities what minimum security measures need to be put in place before the suspension of a registry can be lifted".


Maria Kokkonen, EC spokeswoman for climate issues, said that national registries can be reopened once sufficient security measures have been enacted and member countries submit to the EC a report of their IT security protocol. The Czech registry said there are still legal and administrative hurdles to be overcome and Jiri Stastny, chairman of OTE AS, the Czech registry operator, said that until there is recourse for victims of such theft, and a system is in place to return allowances to their rightful owners, the Czech registry will remain closed.


Registry officials in Germany and Estonia have confirmed they have located , allowances stolen from the Czech registry, according to Mr. The security breaches raised fears among some traders that they might have unknowingly purchased stolen allowances which they might later have to forfeit.


In December a German court sentenced six people to jail terms of between three years and seven years and 10 months in a trial involving evasion of taxes on carbon permits. A French court sentenced five people to one to five years in jail, and to pay massive fines for evading tax through carbon trading.


Seinen also commented that the EU ETS needed to be supported by other policies for technology and renewable energy. According to CCC , p. Researchers Preston Teeter and Jorgen Sandberg have argued that it is largely the uncertainty behind the EU's scheme that has resulted in such a tepid and informal response by regulated organizations. Their research has revealed a similar outcome in Australia, where organizations saw little incentive to innovate and even comply with cap and trade regulations.


This drove the carbon price down to zero in CCC, , p. This problem naturally diminishes as the cap tightens. Over-allocation does not imply that no abatement occurred. Even with over-allocation, there was theoretically a price on carbon except for installations that received hundreds of thousands of free allowances. For some installations, the price had a some effect on emitters' behavior. In September Thomson Reuters Point Carbon calculated that the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period had been oversupplied by about 13 billion tonnes According to Newbery , the price of EUAs was included in the final price of electricity.


Newbery wrote that "[there] is no case for repeating such a wilful misuse of the value of a common property resource that should be owned by the country". The price of emissions permits tripled in the first six months of Phase I, collapsed by half in a one-week period in , and declined to zero over the next twelve months. Such movements and the implied volatility raise questions about the viability of this trading system to provide stable incentives to emitters.


This criticism has face validity. In future phases, measures such as banking of allowances and price floors may be used to mitigate volatility. Nonetheless, producers and consumers in those markets respond rationally and effectively to price signals. Newbery commented that the EU ETS was not delivering the stable carbon price necessary for long-term, low-carbon investment decisions. CERs and ERUs from nuclear facilities and from land use, land use change and forestry may not be used.


The main theoretical advantage of allowing free trading of credits is that it allows mitigation to be done at least-cost CCC, , p. In terms of the UK's climate change policy, CCC , noted three arguments against too great a reliance on credits:.


Emissions trading.


무료 백과 사전, 위키피디아에서.


Emissions trading (or emission trading ) is an administrative approach used to control pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving reductions in the emissions of pollutants. It is sometimes called cap and trade .


A central authority (usually a government or international body) sets a limit or cap on the amount of a pollutant that can be emitted. Companies or other groups are issued emission permits and are required to hold an equivalent number of allowances (or credits ) which represent the right to emit a specific amount. The total amount of allowances and credits cannot exceed the cap, limiting total emissions to that level. Companies that need to increase their emission allowance must buy credits from those who pollute less. The transfer of allowances is referred to as a trade. 사실상, 구매자는 오염에 대한 대가를 지불하고 있지만, 판매자는 필요한 것보다 더 많이 배출량이 감소한 것에 대한 보상을 받고 있습니다. 따라서, 이론적으로 배출을 가장 저렴하게 쉽게 줄일 수있는 사람들은 그렇게 할 것이고, 사회에 가능한 한 최저 비용으로 오염 감소를 달성 할 것이다. [ 1 ]


There are active trading programs in several pollutants. For greenhouse gases the largest is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. [ 2 ] In the United States there is a national market to reduce acid rain and several regional markets in nitrogen oxides [ 3 ] Markets for other pollutants tend to be smaller and more localized.


According to some, cap and trade "is inefficient and prone to market failure", and only a carbon tax "allows you to make an international agreement globally effective in a short period of time." [ 4 ] However, a cap and trade system can be politically preferable for existing industries because the initial allocation of allowances is often allocated with a grandfathering provision where rights are issued in proportion to historical emissions. Most of the money from trading is spent on environmental activities, and the investment directed at sustainable projects that earn credits in the developing world which contribute to the Millennium Development Goals. Critics of emissions trading also point to problems of complexity, cost, monitoring, enforcement, and sometimes dispute the initial allocation methods and cap. [5]


[edit] Overview.


The overall goal of an emissions trading plan is to reduce emissions. The cap is usually lowered over time - aiming towards a national emissions reduction target. In other systems a portion of all traded credits must be retired, causing a net reduction in emissions each time a trade occurs. In many cap and trade systems, organizations which do not pollute may also participate, thus environmental groups can purchase and retire allowances or credits and hence drive up the price of the remainder according to the law of demand. [ 6 ] Corporations can also prematurely retire allowances by donating them to a nonprofit entity and then be eligible for a tax deduction.


Because emissions trading uses markets to determine how to deal with the problem of pollution, it is often touted as an example of effective free market environmentalism. While the cap is usually set by a political process, individual companies are free to choose how or if they will reduce their emissions. In theory, firms will choose the least-costly way to comply with the pollution regulation, creating incentives that reduce the cost of achieving a pollution reduction goal.


[edit] History.


The efficacy of, what later was to be called, the "Cap and Trade" approach to air pollution abatement was first demonstrated in a series of micro-economic computer simulation studies between 1967 and 1970 for the National Air Pollution Control Administration (predecessor to the EPA Air Office) by Ellison Burton and William Sanjour. These studies used mathematical models of several cities and their emission sources in order to compare the cost and effectiveness of various control strategies. [ 7 ] [ 8 ] [ 9 ] [ 10 ] [ 11 ] For each abatement strategy comparison was made with the "least cost solution" produced by a computer optimization program which finds the least costly combination of source reductions to achieve a given abatement goal. [ 12 ] In each case it was found that the least cost solution was dramatically less costly for the same level of pollution produced by any conventional abatement strategy. [ 13 ] This led to the concept of "Cap and Trade" as a means of achieving the "least cost solution" for a given level of abatement.


The development of emissions trading over the course of its history can be divided into four phases: [ 14 ]


Gestation: Theoretical articulation of the instrument (by Coase, Dales, Montgomery etc) and, independent of the former, tinkering with "flexible regulation" at the US Environmental Protection Agency Proof of Principle: First developments towards trading of emission certificates based on the "offset-mechanism" taken up in Clean Air Act in 1977. Prototype: Launching of a first "cap and trade" system as part of US Acid Rain Program, officially announced as a paradigm shift in environmental policy, as prepared by "Project 88", a network building effort to bring together environmental and industrial interests in the US Regime formation: branching out from US clean air policy to global climate policy, and from there to the European Union, along with the expectation of an emerging global carbon market and the formation of the "carbon industry".


[edit] Cap and trade versus baseline and credit.


The textbook emissions trading program can be called a "cap and trade" approach in which an aggregate cap on all sources is established and these sources are then allowed to trade amongst themselves to determine which sources actually emit the total pollution load. An alternative approach with important differences is a baseline and credit program. [ 15 ] In a baseline and credit program a set of polluters that are not under an aggregate cap can create credits by reducing their emissions below a baseline level of emissions. These credits can be purchased by polluters that do have a regulatory limit. Many of the criticisms of trading in general are targeted at baseline and credit programs rather than cap type programs.


[edit] The economics of international emissions trading.


It's possible for a country to reduce emissions using a Command-Control approach, such as regulation, direct and indirect taxes. But that approach is more costly for some countries than for others. That's because the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) — the cost of eliminating an additional unit of pollution — differs by country. It might cost China $2 to eliminate a ton of CO 2 , but it would probably cost Sweden or the U. S. much more. International emissions-trading markets were created precisely to exploit differing MACs.


[edit] Example.


Emissions trading can benefit both the buyer and the seller through 'Gains from Trade'.


Consider two European countries, namely Germany and Sweden. Each can either reduce all the required amount of emissions by itself or it can choose to buy or sell in the market.


For this example let us assume that Germany can abate its CO 2 at a much cheaper cost than Sweden, e. g. MAC S > MAC G where the MAC curve of Sweden is steeper (higher slope) than that of Germany, and R Req is the total amount of emissions that need to be reduced by a country.


On the left side of the graph is the MAC curve for Germany. R Req is the amount of required reductions for Germany, but at R Req the MAC G curve has not intersected the market allowance price of CO 2 (market allowance price = P = О»). Thus, given the market price of CO 2 allowances, Germany has potential to profit if it abates more emissions than required.


On the right side is the MAC curve for Sweden. R Req is the amount of required reductions for Sweden, but the MAC S curve already intersects the market price of CO 2 allowances before R Req has been reached. Thus, given the market allowance price of CO 2 , Sweden has potential to profit if it abates fewer emissions than required internally, and instead abates them elsewhere.


In this example Sweden would abate emissions until its MAC S intersects with P (at R*), but this would only reduce a fraction of Sweden’s total required abatement. After that it could buy emissions credits from Germany for the price 'P' (per unit). The internal cost of Sweden’s own abatement, combined with the credits it buys in the market from Germany, adds up to the total required reductions (R Req ) for Sweden. Thus Sweden can also profit from buying credits in the market (О” d-e-f). This represents the вЂ˜Gains from Trade’, the amount of additional expense that Sweden would otherwise have to spend if it abated all of its required emissions by itself without trading.


Germany made a profit by abating more emissions than required: it met the regulations by abating all of the emissions that was required of it (R Req ). Additionally, Germany sold its surplus to Sweden as credits, and was paid 'P' for every unit it abated, while spending less than 'P'. Its total revenue is the area of the graph (R Req 1 2 R*), its total abatement cost is area (R Req 3 2 R*), and so its net benefit from selling emission credits is the area (О” 1-2-3) i. e. Gains from Trade.


The two R* (on both graphs) represent the efficient allocations that arise from trading.


Germany: sold (R* - R Req ) emission credits to Sweden at a unit price 'P'. Sweden bought emission credits from Germany at a unit price 'P'.


If the total cost for reducing a particular amount of emissions in the 'Command Control' scenario is called 'X', then to reduce the same amount of combined pollution in Sweden and Germany, the total abatement cost would be less in the 'Emissions Trading' scenario i. e. (X - О” 123 - О” def).


The example above applies not just at the national level: it applies just as well between two companies in different countries, or between two subsidiaries within the same company.


[edit] Applying the economic theory.


The nature of the pollutant plays a very important role when policy-makers decide which framework should be used to control pollution.


CO 2 acts globally, thus its impact on the environment is generally similar wherever in the globe it is released. So the location of the originator of the emissions does not really matter from an environmental standpoint.


The policy framework should be different for regional pollutants [ 16 ] (e. g. SO 2 and NO X , and also Mercury) because the impact exerted by these pollutants may not be the same in all locations. The same amount of a regional pollutant can exert a very high impact in some locations and a low impact in other locations, so it does actually matter where the pollutant is released. This is known as the 'Hot Spot' problem.


A Lagrange framework is commonly used to determine the least cost of achieving an objective, in this case the total reduction in emissions required in a year. In some cases it is possible to use the Lagrange optimization framework to determine the required reductions for each country (based on their MAC) so that the total cost of reduction is minimized. In such a scenario, the Lagrange Multiplier represents the market allowance price (P) of a pollutant, such as the current market allowance price of emissions in Europe [ 17 ] and the USA. [ 18 ]


All countries face the market allowance price as existent in the market that day, so they are able to make individual decisions that would maximize their profit while at the same time achieving regulatory compliance. This is also another version of the Equi-Marginal Principle, commonly used in economics to choose the most economically efficient decision.


[edit] Prices versus quantities, and the safety valve.


There has been longstanding debate on the relative merits of price versus quantity instruments to achieve emission reductions. [ 19 ]


An emission cap and permit trading system is a quantity instrument because it fixes the overall emission level (quantity) and allows the price to vary. One problem with the cap and trade system is the uncertainty of the cost of compliance as the price of a permit is not known in advance and will vary over time according to market conditions. In contrast, an emission tax is a price instrument because it fixes the price while the emission level is allowed to vary according to economic activity. A major drawback of an emission tax is that the environmental outcome (e. g. a limit on the amount of emissions) is not guaranteed.


The best choice depends on the sensitivity of the costs of emission reduction, compared to the sensitivity of the benefits (i. e., climate damages avoided by a reduction) when the level of emission control is varied.


Because there is high uncertainty in the compliance costs of firms, some argue that the optimum choice is the price mechanism.


However, some scientists have warned of a threshold in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide beyond which a run-away warming effect could take place, with a large possibility of causing irreversible damages. If this is a conceivable risk then a quantity instrument could be a better choice because the quantity of emissions may be capped with a higher degree of certainty. However, this may not be true if this risk exists but cannot be attached to a known level of GHG concentration or a known emission pathway. [ 20 ]


A third option, known as a safety valve , is a hybrid of the price and quantity instruments. The system is essentially an emission cap and tradeable permit system but the maximum (or minimum) permit price is capped. Emitters have the choice of either obtaining permits in the marketplace or purchasing them from the government at a specified trigger price (which could be adjusted over time). The system is sometimes recommended as a way of overcoming the fundamental disadvantages of both systems by giving governments the flexibility to adjust the system as new information comes to light. It can be shown that by setting the trigger price high enough, or the number of permits low enough, the safety valve can be used to mimic either a pure quantity or pure price mechanism. [ 21 ]


All three methods are being used as policy instruments to control greenhouse gas emissions: the EU-ETS is a quantity system using the cap and trading system to meet targets set by National Allocation Plans, the UK's Climate Change Levy is a price system using a direct carbon tax, while China uses the CO 2 market price for funding of its Clean Development Mechanism projects, but imposes a safety valve of a minimum price per tonne of CO 2 .


[edit] Trading systems.


[edit] Kyoto Protocol.


The Kyoto Protocol is a 1997 international treaty which came into force in 2005, which binds most developed nations to a cap and trade system for the six major greenhouse gases. [ 22 ] (The United States is the only industrialized nation under Annex I which has not ratified and therefore is not bound by it.) Emission quotas were agreed by each participating country, with the intention of reducing their overall emissions by 5.2% of their 1990 levels by the end of 2012. Under the treaty, for the 5-year compliance period from 2008 until 2012, [ 23 ] nations that emit less than their quota will be able to sell emissions credits to nations that exceed their quota.


It is also possible for developed countries within the trading scheme to sponsor carbon projects that provide a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in other countries, as a way of generating tradeable carbon credits. The Protocol allows this through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects, in order to provide flexible mechanisms to aid regulated entities in meeting their compliance with their caps. The UNFCCC validates all CDM projects to ensure they create genuine additional savings and that there is no carbon leakage .


The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has projected that the financial effect of compliance through trading within the Kyoto commitment period will be 'limited' at between 0.1-1.1% of GDP among trading countries. [ 24 ] By comparison the Stern report placed the costs of doing nothing at five to 20 times higher. [ 25 ]


[edit] Australia.


[edit] Garnaut Draft Report.


In 2003 the New South Wales (NSW) state government unilaterally established the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme to reduce emissions by requiring electricity generators and large consumers to purchase NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (NGACs). This has prompted the rollout of free energy-efficient compact fluorescent lightbulbs and other energy-efficiency measures, funded by the credits. This scheme has been criticised by the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets of the UNSW (CEEM) because of its reliance upon offsets. [ 26 ]


On 4 June 2007, former Prime Minister John Howard announced an Australian Carbon Trading Scheme to be introduced by 2012, but opposition parties called the plan "too little, too late." [ 27 ] On 24 November 2007 Howard's coalition government lost a general election and was succeeded by the Labor Party, with Kevin Rudd taking over as prime minister. Prime Minister Rudd announced that a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme would be introduced in 2010. [ 28 ]


Australia's Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments commissioned the Garnaut Climate Change Review, a study by Professor Ross Garnaut on the mechanism of a potential emissions trading scheme. Its interim report was released on 21 February 2008. [ 29 ] It recommended an emissions trading scheme that includes transportation but not agriculture, and that emissions permits should be sold competitively and not allocated free to carbon polluters. It recognised that energy prices will increase and that low income families will need to be compensated. It recommended more support for research into low emissions technologies and a new body to oversee such research. It also recognised the need for transition assistance for coal mining areas. [ 30 ]


In response to Garnaut's draft report, the Rudd Labor government issued a Green Paper [ 31 ] on 16 July that described the intended design of the actual trading scheme. Draft legislation will be released in December 2008, to become law in 2009. [ 32 ]


[edit] European Union.


The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (or EU ETS) is the largest multi-national, greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the world and was created in conjunction with the Kyoto Protocol.


After voluntary trials in the UK and Denmark, Phase I commenced operation in January 2005 with all 15 (now 25 of the 27) member states of the European Union participating. [ 33 ] The program caps the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted from large installations, such as power plants and carbon intensive factories and covers almost half of the EU's Carbon Dioxide emissions. [ 34 ] Phase I permits participants to trade amongst themselves and in validated credits from the developing world through Kyoto's Clean Development Mechanism.


Whilst the first phase (2005 - 2007) has received much criticism due to oversupply of allowances and the distribution method of allowances (via grandfathering rather than auctioning), Phase II links the ETS to other countries participating in the Kyoto trading system. The European Commission has been tough on Member States' Plans for Phase II, dismissing many of them as being too loose again. [ 35 ] In addition, the first phase has established a strong carbon market. Compliance was high in 2006, increasing confidence in the scheme, although the value of allowances dropped when the national caps were met.


All EU member states have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and so the second phase of the EU ETS has been designed to support the Kyoto mechanisms and compliance period. Thus any organisation trading through the ETS should also meet the international trading obligations under Kyoto.


[edit] New Zealand.


The New Zealand Government introduced a bill for emissions trading schemes before a select committee. Various reports by a range of groups support the scheme but differ in opinion as to how it should be implemented. [ 36 ] An interesting feature of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme is that it includes forest carbon and creates deforestation liabilities for landowners. [ 37 ]


The emissions trading bill passed into law on 10 September 2008. On November 16 2008 the newly formed National-led government announced that it would delay implementation of the ETS pending a full review of climate change policy.


[edit] United States.


An early example of an emission trading system has been the SO 2 trading system under the framework of the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean Air Act in the U. S. Under the program, which is essentially a cap-and-trade emissions trading system, SO 2 emissions are expected to be reduced by 50 percent from 1980 levels by 2010. Some experts argue that the "cap and trade" system of SO 2 emissions reduction has reduced the cost of controlling acid rain by as much as 80 percent versus source-by-source reduction [ 38 ] [ 39 ]


In 1997, the State of Illinois adopted a trading program for volatile organic compounds in most of the Chicago area, called the Emissions Reduction Market System. [ 40 ] Beginning in 2000, over 100 major sources of pollution in eight Illinois counties began trading pollution credits.


In 2003, New York State proposed and attained commitments from nine Northeast states to form a cap and trade carbon dioxide emissions program for power generators, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This program is due to launch on January 1 , 2009 with the aim to reduce the carbon "budget" of each state's electricity generation sector to 10 percent below their 2009 allowances by 2018. [ 41 ]


Also in 2003, U. S. corporations were able to trade CO 2 emission allowances on the Chicago Climate Exchange under a voluntary scheme. In August 2007, the Exchange announced a mechanism to create emission offsets for projects within the United States that cleanly destroy ozone-depleting substances. [ 42 ]


In 2007, the California Legislature passed the California Global Warming Solutions Act, AB-32, which was signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Thus far, flexible mechanisms in the form of project based offsets have been suggested for five main project types. A carbon project would create offsets by showing that it has reduced carbon dioxide and equivalent gases. The project types include: manure management, forestry, building energy, SF6, and landfill gas capture. California is also one of seven states and three Canadian province that have joined together to create the Western Climate Initiative, which has recommended the creation of a regional greenhouse gas control and offset trading environment. [ 43 ]


On November 17, 2008 President-elect Barack Obama clarified, in a talk recorded for YouTube, that the US will enter a cap and trade system to limit Global Warming. [ 44 ]


The 2010 United States federal budget proposes to support clean energy development with a 10-year investment of US $15 billion per year, generated from the sale of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions credits. Under the proposed cap-and-trade program, all GHG emissions credits would be auctioned off, generating an estimated $78.7 billion in additional revenue in FY 2012, steadily increasing to $83 billion by FY 2019. [ 45 ]


[edit] Renewable energy certificates.


Renewable Energy Certificates, or "green tags", are transferable rights for renewable energy within some American states. A renewable energy provider gets issued one green tag for each 1,000 KWh of energy it produces. The energy is sold into the electrical grid, and the certificates can be sold on the open market for additional profit. They are purchased by firms or individuals in order to identify a portion of their energy with renewable sources and are voluntary.


They are typically used like an offsetting scheme or to show corporate responsibility, although their issuance is unregulated, with no national registry to ensure there is no double-counting. However, it is one way that an organization could purchase its energy from a local provider who uses fossil fuels, but back it with a certificate that supports a specific wind or hydro power project.


[edit] The carbon market.


Carbon emissions trading is emissions trading specifically for carbon dioxide (calculated in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent or tCO 2 e) and currently makes up the bulk of emissions trading. It is one of the ways countries can meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions and thereby mitigate global warming.


[edit] Market trend.


Carbon emissions trading has been steadily increasing in recent years. According to the World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit, 374 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO 2 e) were exchanged through projects in 2005, a 240% increase relative to 2004 (110 mtCO 2 e) [ 46 ] which was itself a 41% increase relative to 2003 (78 mtCO 2 e). [ 47 ]


In terms of dollars, the World Bank has estimated that the size of the carbon market was 11 billion USD in 2005, 30 billion USD in 2006, [ 46 ] and 64 billion in 2007. [ 48 ]


The Marrakesh Accords of the Kyoto protocol defined the international trading mechanisms and registries needed to support trading between countries, with allowance trading now occurring between European countries and Asian countries. However, while the USA as a nation did not ratify the Protocol, many of its states are now developing cap-and-trade systems and are looking at ways to link their emissions trading systems together, nationally and internationally, to seek out the lowest costs and improve liquidity of the market. [ 49 ] However, these states also wish to preserve their individual integrity and unique features. For example, in contrast to the other Kyoto-compliant systems, some states propose other types of greenhouse gas sources, different measurement methods, setting a maximum on the price of allowances, or restricting access to CDM projects. Creating instruments that are not truly fungible would introduce instability and make pricing difficult. Various proposals are being investigated to see how these systems might be linked across markets, with the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) as an international body to help co-ordinate this. [ 50 ] [ 51 ]


[edit] Business reaction.


With the creation of a market for mandatory trading of carbon dioxide emissions within the Kyoto Protocol, the London financial marketplace has established itself as the center of the carbon finance market, and is expected to have grown into a market valued at $60 billion in 2007. [ 52 ] The voluntary offset market, by comparison, is projected to grow to about $4bn by 2010. [ 53 ]


23 multinational corporations came together in the G8 Climate Change Roundtable, a business group formed at the January 2005 World Economic Forum. The group included Ford, Toyota, British Airways, BP and Unilever. On 9 June 2005 the Group published a statement stating that there was a need to act on climate change and stressing the importance of market-based solutions. It called on governments to establish "clear, transparent, and consistent price signals" through "creation of a long-term policy framework" that would include all major producers of greenhouse gases. [ 54 ] By December 2007 this had grown to encompass 150 global businesses. [ 55 ]


Business in the UK have come out strongly in support of emissions trading as a key tool to mitigate climate change, supported by NGOs. [ 56 ] However, not all businesses favor a trading approach. On December 11, 2008, Rex Tillerson, the CEO of Exxonmobil, said a carbon tax is "a more direct, more transparent and more effective approach" than a cap and trade program, which he said, "inevitably introduces unnecessary cost and complexity." He also said that he hoped that the revenues from a carbon tax would be used to lower other taxes so as to be revenue neutral. [ 57 ]


[edit] Measuring, reporting, verification (MRV) and enforcement.


Meaningful emission reductions within a trading system can only occur if they can be measured at the level of operator or installation and reported to a regulator. For greenhouse gases all trading countries maintain an inventory of emissions at national and installation level; in addition, the trading groups within North America maintain inventories at the state level through The Climate Registry. For trading between regions these inventories must be consistent, with equivalent units and measurement techniques.


In some industrial processes emissions can be physically measured by inserting sensors and flowmeters in chimneys and stacks, but many types of activity rely on theoretical calculations for measurement. Depending on local legislation, these measurements may require additional checks and verification by government or third party auditors, prior or post submission to the local regulator.


Another critical part is enforcement. [ 58 ] Without effective MRV and enforcement the value of allowances are diminished. Enforcement can be done using several means, including fines or sanctioning those that have exceeded their allowances. Concerns include the cost of MRV and enforcement and the risk that facilities may be tempted to mislead rather than make real reductions or make up their shortfall by purchasing allowances or offsets from another entity. The net effect of a corrupt reporting system or poorly managed or financed regulator may be a discount on emission costs, and a (hidden) increase in actual emissions.


[edit] Criticism.


There are critics of the methods, mainly environmental justice nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and movements, who see carbon trading as a proliferation of the free market into public spaces and environmental policy-making. [ 59 ] They level accusations of failures in accounting, dubious science and the destructive impacts of projects upon local peoples and environments as reasons why trading pollution allowances should be avoided. [ 60 ] In its place they advocate making reductions at the source of pollution and energy policies that are justice-based and community-driven. [ 61 ] Most of the criticisms have been focused on the carbon market created through investment in Kyoto Mechanisms. Criticism of 'cap and trade' emissions trading has generally been more limited to lack of credibility in the first phase of the EU ETS.


Critics argue that emissions trading does little to solve pollution problems overall, as groups that do not pollute sell their conservation to the highest bidder. Overall reductions would need to come from a sufficient and challenging reduction of allowances available in the system.


Regulatory agencies run the risk of issuing too many emission credits, diluting the effectiveness of regulation, and practically removing the cap. In this case, instead of any net reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, beneficiaries of emissions trading simply do more of the polluting activity. The National Allocation Plans by member governments of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme were criticised for this when it became apparent that actual emissions would be less than the government-issued carbon allowances at the end of Phase I of the scheme.


They have also been criticised for the practice of grandfathering, where polluters are given free allowances by governments, instead of being made to pay for them. [ 62 ] Critics instead advocate for auctioning the credits. The proceeds could be used for research and development of sustainable technology. [ 63 ]


Critics of carbon trading, such as Carbon Trade Watch, argue that it places disproportionate emphasis on individual lifestyles and carbon footprints, distracting attention from the wider, systemic changes and collective political action that needs to be taken to tackle climate change. [ 59 ] Groups such as the Corner House (organisation) have argued that the market will choose the easiest means to save a given quantity of carbon in the short term, which may be different to the pathway required to obtain sustained and sizable reductions over a longer period, and so a market led approach is likely to reinforce technological lock-in. For instance small cuts may often be achieved cheaply through investment in making a technology more efficient, where larger cuts would require scrapping the technology and using a different one. They also argue that emissions trading is undermining alternative approaches to pollution control with which it does not combine well, and so the overall effect it is having is to actually stall significant change to less polluting technologies.


The problem of unstable prices can be resolved, to some degree, by the creation of forward markets in caps. Nevertheless, it is easier to make a tax predictable than the price of a cap. However, the corresponding uncertainty under a tax is the level of emissions reductions achieved.


The Financial Times wrote an article on cap and trade systems that argues that "Carbon markets create a muddle" and ". leave much room for unverifiable manipulation". [ 64 ]


More recent criticism of emissions trading regarding implementation is that old growth forests (which have slow carbon absorption rates) are being cleared and replaced with fast-growing vegetation, to the detriment of the local communities. [ 65 ]


Recent proposals for alternative schemes that seek to avoid the problems of Cap and Trade schemes include Cap and Share, which at May 2008 is being actively considered by the Irish Parliament, and the Sky Trust schemes.


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Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a maximum cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by all participating installations. Installations must monitor and report their CO 2 emissions, ensuring they hand in enough allowances to the authorities to cover their emissions.


If emission exceeds what is permitted by its allowances, an installation must purchase allowances from others. Conversely, if an installation has performed well at reducing its emissions, it can sell its leftover credits. This allows the system to find the most cost-effective ways of reducing emissions without significant government intervention. The scheme has been divided into a number of "trading periods". The second trading period ran from January until December , coinciding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.


The third trading period began in January and will span until December This target has been reached six years early as emissions in the ETS fell to mln tonnes in The EU ETS has seen a number of significant changes, with the first trading period described as a 'learning by doing' phase.


Overall, since its conception, the EU ETS has been characterized by relatively high levels of policy uncertainty. As a result, the scheme has resulted in a rather informal and tepid response by regulated organizations. The "Linking Directive" allows operators to use a certain amount of Kyoto certificates from flexible mechanism projects in order to cover their emissions. These Certified Emission Reductions CERs can be obtained by implementing emission reduction projects in developing countries, outside the EU, that have ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol.


The implementation of Clean Development Projects is largely specified by the Marrakech Accords , a follow-on set of agreements by the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The legislators of the EU ETS drew up the scheme independently but called on the experiences gained during the running of the voluntary UK Emissions Trading Scheme in the previous years, [16] and collaborated with other parties to ensure its units and mechanisms were compatible with the design agreed through the UNFCCC.


Those countries then allocate allowances to their industrial operators, and track and validate the actual emissions in accordance with the relevant assigned amount. They require the allowances to be retired after the end of each year. Like any other financial instrument , trading consists of matching buyers and sellers between members of the exchange and then settling by depositing a valid allowance in exchange for the agreed financial consideration.


Much like a stock market , companies and private individuals can trade through brokers who are listed on the exchange, and need not be regulated operators. When each change of ownership of an allowance is proposed, the national registry and the European Commission are informed in order for them to validate the transaction. However, the EU was not able to link trades from all its countries until because of its technical problems connecting to the UN systems.


The total number of permits issued either auctioned or allocated determines the supply for the allowances. The actual price is determined by the market. Too many allowances compared to demand will result in a low carbon price, and reduced emission abatement efforts. The first and foremost criterion is that the proposed total quantity is in line with a Member State's Kyoto target. Of course, the Member State's plan can, and should, also take account of emission levels in other sectors not covered by the EU ETS, and address these within its own domestic policies.


This approach has been criticized [21] as giving rise to windfall profits , being less efficient than auctioning, and providing too little incentive for innovative new competition to provide clean, renewable energy. To address these problems, [ citation needed ] the European Commission proposed various changes in a January package, including the abolishment of NAPs from and auctioning a far greater share ca.


From the start of Phase III January there will be a centralised allocation of permits, not National Allocation Plans, with a greater share of auctioning of permits. Allocation can act as a means of addressing concerns over loss of competitiveness , and possible "leakage" carbon leakage of emissions outside the EU. Leakage is the effect of emissions increasing in countries or sectors that have weaker regulation of emissions than the regulation in another country or sector.


Correcting for leakage by allocating permits acts as a temporary subsidy for affected industries, but does not fix the underlying problem. Border adjustments would be the economically efficient choice, where imports are taxed according to their carbon content.


Within a certain trading period, banking and borrowing is allowed. For example, a EUA can be used in banking or in borrowing. Interperiod borrowing is not allowed.


However, the prior existence of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme meant that market participants were already in place and ready. In , carbon prices for the trial phase dropped to near zero for most of the year. Meanwhile, prices for Phase II remained significantly higher throughout, reflecting the fact that allowances for the trial phase were set to expire by 31 December Verified emissions show a net increase over the first phase of the scheme.


For the countries for which data was available, emissions increased by 1. Consequently, observers have accused national governments of abusing the system under industry pressure, and have urged for far stricter caps in the second phase The second phase 12 expanded the scope of the scheme significantly. Although this was a theoretical possibility in phase I, the over-allocation of permits combined with the inability to bank them for use in the second phase meant it was not taken up.


The full activation process will include the migration of over 30, EU ETS accounts from national registries. Aviation emissions were to be included from The airline industry and other countries including China, India, Russia, and the United States reacted adversely to the inclusion of the aviation sector.


The EU insisted that the regulation should be applied equally to all carriers, and that it did not contravene international regulations.


In the absence of a global agreement on airline emissions, the EU argued that it was forced to go ahead with its own scheme. But only flights within the EEA are covered; international flights are not. Ultimately, the Commission intended that the third trading period should cover all greenhouse gases and all sectors, including aviation, maritime transport, and forestry.


The annual Member State CO 2 yearly allowances in million tonnes are shown in the table:. Additional installations and emissions included in the second trading period are not included in this table but are given in the sources. Prices for EU allowances for December delivery dropped 8. The market had been oversupplied with permits. In July , Thomson Reuters Point Carbon stated that it considered that without intervention to reduce the supply of allowances, the price of allowances would fall to four Euros.


As well as more sectors and gases included in Phase III. Also, millions of allowances set aside in the New Entrants Reserve NER to fund the deployment of innovative renewable energy technologies and carbon capture and storage through the NER programme, one of the world's largest funding programmes for innovative low-carbon energy demonstration projects. Phase IV will commence on 1 January and finish on 31 December The European Commission plans a full review of the Directive by Connie Hedegaard, the EU Commissioner for Climate Change, hoped "to link up the ETS with compatible systems around the world to form the backbone of a global carbon market" with Australia cited as an example.


Before the European Council summit on 20 March , [72] the European Commission decided to propose a change in the functioning of the carbon market CO2 permits. The reserve would operate on predefined rules with no discretion for the Commission or Member States. The European Parliament and the European council informally agreed on an adapted version of this proposal, which sets the starting date of the MSR to so already in Phase III , puts the million backloaded allowances in the reserve and reduces the reaction time of the MSR to one year.


This adapted proposal has already passed the European parliament and is to be approved by the Council of ministers in September Emissions in the EU have been reduced at costs that are significantly lower than projected, [28] though transaction costs are related to economies of scale and can be significant for smaller installations.


It was suggested that if permits were auctioned, and the revenues used effectively, e. However, some governments and industry representatives lobby for their inclusion. The inclusion is currently opposed by NGOs as well as the EU commission itself, arguing that sinks are surrounded by too many scientific uncertainties over their permanence and that they have inferior long-term contribution to climate change compared to reducing emissions from industrial sources.


A phishing scam is suspected to have enabled hackers to log into unsuspecting companies' carbon credit accounts and transfer the allowances to themselves, allowing them to then be sold.


The European Commission said it would "proceed to determine together with national authorities what minimum security measures need to be put in place before the suspension of a registry can be lifted".


Maria Kokkonen, EC spokeswoman for climate issues, said that national registries can be reopened once sufficient security measures have been enacted and member countries submit to the EC a report of their IT security protocol. The Czech registry said there are still legal and administrative hurdles to be overcome and Jiri Stastny, chairman of OTE AS, the Czech registry operator, said that until there is recourse for victims of such theft, and a system is in place to return allowances to their rightful owners, the Czech registry will remain closed.


Registry officials in Germany and Estonia have confirmed they have located , allowances stolen from the Czech registry, according to Mr. The security breaches raised fears among some traders that they might have unknowingly purchased stolen allowances which they might later have to forfeit.


In December a German court sentenced six people to jail terms of between three years and seven years and 10 months in a trial involving evasion of taxes on carbon permits. A French court sentenced five people to one to five years in jail, and to pay massive fines for evading tax through carbon trading.


Seinen also commented that the EU ETS needed to be supported by other policies for technology and renewable energy. According to CCC , p. Researchers Preston Teeter and Jorgen Sandberg have argued that it is largely the uncertainty behind the EU's scheme that has resulted in such a tepid and informal response by regulated organizations. Their research has revealed a similar outcome in Australia, where organizations saw little incentive to innovate and even comply with cap and trade regulations.


This drove the carbon price down to zero in CCC, , p. This problem naturally diminishes as the cap tightens. Over-allocation does not imply that no abatement occurred. Even with over-allocation, there was theoretically a price on carbon except for installations that received hundreds of thousands of free allowances. For some installations, the price had a some effect on emitters' behavior. In September Thomson Reuters Point Carbon calculated that the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period had been oversupplied by about 13 billion tonnes According to Newbery , the price of EUAs was included in the final price of electricity.


Newbery wrote that "[there] is no case for repeating such a wilful misuse of the value of a common property resource that should be owned by the country". The price of emissions permits tripled in the first six months of Phase I, collapsed by half in a one-week period in , and declined to zero over the next twelve months. Such movements and the implied volatility raise questions about the viability of this trading system to provide stable incentives to emitters.


This criticism has face validity. In future phases, measures such as banking of allowances and price floors may be used to mitigate volatility. Nonetheless, producers and consumers in those markets respond rationally and effectively to price signals. Newbery commented that the EU ETS was not delivering the stable carbon price necessary for long-term, low-carbon investment decisions. CERs and ERUs from nuclear facilities and from land use, land use change and forestry may not be used.


The main theoretical advantage of allowing free trading of credits is that it allows mitigation to be done at least-cost CCC, , p. In terms of the UK's climate change policy, CCC , noted three arguments against too great a reliance on credits:.

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